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\; kr thlr rtrtsmeat we addrasr two issuer raimd by Senate
Bill-#!?& 60 ia&aeof jury size and t h l of the aremptory
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This article wcu submftted faintly by the author and Dr. gay
Schulrnrn as prepared testimony, m u p p J ~ w ~ t i qqg .
Schulrnsn's or61 testimony of Septsmber a,tW7, ta .the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee an h p m v ~ m e nof
t J~di&l
Machinery. ' h e subaommittew wm qomrldaring 6-s
Bid
2074, an omnibus bill which, anorqj ather thfngs, would
have required a11 United 8tates Distdct Courts ta sMt~h,
from twelve ta six member juries in civil c a g ~ aand waald
have decreased the numbir of available premptory
challenges in civil cases from three te two. Upom c~mpletion of the hearings on this bill, these ~avisianswere
deleted f r m the version sent to the fu Committee, It
should be noted that most Di$trict Coukts by lam1
use
six member juqies in 4kiJ cases. The argument in the text
3. '
suggests that the Congrem migktwish t~ forbild this p ~ a ~ t r (i ~ ~
ri .
by dtatqte or at least limit it to celrfrgli~cateso&asof caseti.
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'a~by dihcolllq~the ideals -o mr system
abl-j~ry'judce
a ~ , we@ in which ths operating syltem
x~a~ema~iky
falls abort of the i#eals.

c3!!hml~ ~ E r E ~ ~ a r
The!ideal jury (a) is re reseatmrtilve of the people living
*

~ i m nthe jurisdiction o! the eaurt, (b) is unbiased, (c)
rl.t~We8a case on thb basis of the evidence presented. (dj

evalu~teethe evidence in the light of the judge's insstrucKOM on the law, 'kind [e) in appropriate cases mitigates the
dgliiity of the law by reflecting in its verdict fundamental
MacipLs of justice and morality. With the exception of the
1ar.t oint most of those who have written about the jury
~ o u y dagree with t h i ~description of the ideal. Point [el

c a w s d&iitg+k%W3W beoaose of i b obviour incorhl~teney
widp poiit@ 13 d I&; i f am honest evaluation of the
wkkme Psnd a pod ddih appll~atioaof ths law always led
Sa j ~ tmoral
.
m@s, arguaenk awrotrrning the propriety of
&S
hrqs oeme 10 )3u: m1M jury nullification would not
e d a . We will rwf commsnt 08 the matter of jury mlilficatbm~a m g t b mate that om sybt&~m
br &vebped a peculiar
wmpmmiw ia
-a-in
~dmsfjuri~rPictiomjurors have
the d~ fach power U7nulEfythe requirements of the law
lo "seism" tbc requirements
wldwce (or 1~civil
of hw
5 t own
~
WR.BE of justioe) but they are not told
h y bawe it. Instead, we wish tu 11028 another tendon and
t b -comprodn&~our sy~temurns to GO a with it. This 6s the
hiheil.@mttemion between the ideal o the re resreatative
ury and ths +mand thst the /my be unbisuel competent
its evaluation of the aviden& and comprehending in its
applicatfr~n
of judicial fnrstru.ction&
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Representat~ves drawn randomly from a community
share the biases and prejudices that characterize memberr
of that community. The prejudices may be irrelevant to the
matter being litigated. they may be benign, or they may run
counter to values that are deeply engrained in our legal
iystem. Common prejudices include the belief that a police
~fficer'sword is better than the average citizen's as well as
the belief that no police officer can be trusted. They range
from the feeling that no tort judgment is excessive because
the insurance companies exist to pay claims to the feeling
that only a chiseler would seek to collect for pain and wffering. Prejudices color the way in which jurors evaluate
evidence, yet often even unprejudiced jurors are likely to
be incapable of appreciating the true value ot evidence presented. Finally, it is clear that jurors sometimes have difficulty in understanding judicial instructions and applying
them to the facts of a case.
Others have noted the tension between the demand that
juries be competent, unbiased factfinders and the requirenent that juries be representative of the larger community.
Phis observation is typically the empirical linchpin in
arguments made by those who, at least in civil cases, would
abolish h e jury and transfer its factfinding functions to the
judge. But those who argue this way make a fundamental
mistake. They attribute the jury's deficiencies t~ the fact
that individuals chosen arbitrarily from the community ate
ornetimes uneducated, sometimes uncaring and typically
egaliy naive. In fact, most of the drawbacks attributed to
he democratic nature of the jupy have little to do with the
resentativeniess requirement. Instead they are ata simpler, inescapable source: the human cone coltect biases as they ga through life. While
k r in their ability to disregard them, there is
one whose observations will not at some time
by his biases. Even if such an individual exval;uation of evidence would still be far from
substantial body of research now exists
ernonstrating ways in which people consistently misstirnate the implications of information given them.
udges, alas., are also human. They can no more escape
dangers of biased perception and falIible information
cessing t h m the jurors over whom they preside. If
judges have an advantage over jurors in their presumed understanding of the law, they are disadvantaged in that their
public posi't3an subjects them to pressures that may
systematically reinborce or create biases. Indeed, judges
are at times elected or appointed in part because of the
appeal of biases that are ideally irrelevant in the factfinding process. Furthermore, judges typically play an administrative as weiE as a, judicial role. As administrators
-they are necessarily concerned with the efficient functioning of a judicial bureaucracy. Too often behavior which
ppomotes bureaucratic efficiency is antithetical to our
system's ideal of individualized justice. In such matters as
criminal sentencing, judieiali behavior may be influenced
by the legally irrelevant consideration of whether the
cauct"s time has been 'kwasted" by a jury trial. fn civil trials

inherent value in an instiarantrees the insertion of a
y p i n t in the trial process.
at e- Congress should rake
romatltic idealization of the
ink that the jury today is a
ever will be. But by the same

token the jury should not be regarded as an imperfect substitute for a judge, an institution that will necessarily im-L'
prove as it comes more closely to resemble or be influeneed
by one exalted individual learned in the law. In particular,
the Congress should be skeptical of reforms that merely
save money (given that the amount of money expended on
jury trials is a pittance compared to our total expenditures
on the justice system and this sum is in turn but a minute
portion of governmental budgets) and particularly
suspicious of reforms whose primary virtue is that they ease
the tasks of judges and court administrators. The continued
vitality of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments should be
accepted as a starting point. This means that jury trial will
necessarily be with us in the foreseeable future. The issue
is how may the institution be made more effective in
promoting the qalued goal of fair and accurate factfinding.
The, starting point for inquiry is with the apparent
weaknesses of factfinding by average individuals.
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JurySize
We specified thqye posrible deficiencies in lay factfinding: the biases may influence gerceptianr. the probative
d
m
weight of evidence nay be distorted, a ~ i,mt~w~tiqps
the law m%$y
be misunderst~od.Them ore all pr~biemsthat
are ameliorrtted by group decision making. .In group^, expresaions of bias may beUnhibited o,r properly dismissed a$
individuals with conflipting points of view call each other to
account. Totally apart from bias, group factual judgments
tend to be more accurate than those made by individuals. .
An individual is at all times left to his own devices while a
group may receive contributions from many individuals,
Where, for example, memory is i h g r t a n t as in recalling
the testimony of various witnqd'es, one indfadual may
recall certain facts while another recalls others. Where a
problem is inescapably ambiguous, error variaac,e is reduced when individual judgments are averaged together.
Where understanding is difficult, as with a judge's instructions, a lone decision maker is lost if he does not understand. A person in a group may Benefit from the understanding of others. Groups, in shart, are in many ways as strong
as their strongest link.
These advantagds of group decision making are mire
pronounced as group size increases, until the point where
the contributions of newlrnamb:sreare offset by incre~sing
roblems of coordination and morale. However, even
efore the point of negative returns each additional new
member is likely to add somewhat less to the quality of
group decision making than the parson before him. The
question facing the Congress is whether differences in the
quality of decisions rendered by six and twelve member
groups are likely to be so great that the quality of jury
justice will be decreased by mandating the smaller number.
Our feeling is that this is the case. In clear earses, six and
twelve member juries should decide similarly, although the
occasional decision against the weight of the evidenaa will
be more common with the smaller group. fa close cases,
decisions of larger juriw should, on the average, be better
with respect to auch care legal values as u n b i a d factfinding, thorough camideration of the evidence, and consistency across similar ceses.
It can be shown stsfistically that minority viewpoints are
substantially more likely to be represented in (more or less] .
randomly chosen groups of twelve than in similarly chown
groups of six. The greater heterogeneity of the larger p u p
makes it a setting in which individual prejudices are more
likely to cancel out and in which individuals with valuable
specialized knowledge or particularly astute insights are
mare likely to be available. A further advantage e4oyed by
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larger juries is that they are more likely to render similar
decisions in similar cases. Where individual judgments are
averaged, as is often the case in civil litigation despite the
official disrepute of quotient verdicts, averages taken
aorom twelve individual? are likely to diverge less than
averages taken across six. Even where 'udgments are not
a v e r a d * P U P S of twelve are more likely to resemble
each other than groups of six, in that larger groups more accurately reflect the population from which they are drawn.
In short. both statistical modeling and the existing
research on small grouPB make it clear that proponents of
six member juries cannot substantiate the claim that such
juries are likely to be better decision makers than juries of
twelve. Indeed, even the weaker burden of showing that the
switch to smaller juries will not positively harm the quality
of jury justice cannot be met- While Proponents of larger
juries cannot specify precisely the degree to which the
decisions of twelve are likely to be better than those of six, a
fair reading of the evidence indicates that the advantage
generally lies with twelve, perhaps by a considerable
margin. Thus, it is Our strong recommendation that CongreSS not interfere with those federal district courts that
have been able to resist the bureaucratic siren song of six
member juries, choosing to opt for the higher
quality ofldelivered justice likely to be
associated with juries of, twelve.

Indeed, our preference is a statute requiring all districts tu
allow litigants the option of a larger jury, at least ih cases
where substantial amounts of money are at stake or important values clash. The additional expense of larger juries is
miniscule relative to the federal budget and slight relative
to total judicial expenditures.
Some have asked, "If twelve jurors are better than six
why aren't thirteen or fourteen jurors better than twelve?"
This question is put forth as if it were a response to the
argumentsof thosewhofavortheretentionofthe twelve
member jury. It is not responsive. If fourteen jurors in fact
perform better than twelve this fact supports rather than
undercuts the conclusion that twelve jurors perform better
than six, Those who write on jury size rarely address the
issue of juries larger than twelve because the debate over
jury size is for practical purposes constrained by political
reality and today's political reality is that juries are going to
be of no more than twelve members. Nonetheless, it is interesting to speculate about the desirability of juries with
more than twelve members. Several points can be made.
First, we do not know whether juries of sizes thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, or higher might reach decisions of a higher
quality than those reached by twelve member
juries in some or all cases. Second, the value of
additional jurors apparently increases at a decreasing rate. Thus, any increase in the
quality of jury decision making that
results from goi~lg,for example, from
twelve jurors to fourteen is not likely
to be as great as the increase
brought about by going from ten
jurors to twelve.
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tan t to exduda )umcs far eatlse
bias ifthe jurar sat= &at hi8
by thdf apparent
f o l t . ~ ~
ly support such lower eat&tiffs a t t ~ ~ n einy a suit bm&P a&nst en inaurama campiny might wish Po &dleltge far mum a jtlm;r whm$
pments were agents fog 9arn.e other immnm wzqmny. If
the ju~orstates art
family tisa d
l wt hf1.0ea~eMs
decision, a challenge far
will be umvsrilirzb9e is many
courts. The dsdsim wt to e-xcl~de
for cause in &me circarrnstmicesl may be juetifiable, But it is nat jetotffiable an the
ground that the iurar ean be trust~dto diyregard the abvtaua
wuwe of Mas. A gmglige to UX wide one's biams ir) inher-tb sw=fil lmamw P-P t3,are oft^^ m&n@war@
Of lafw
a f f e t their i u d ~ a n t s .The: ~rornissis even
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~ ~ elwlkers
r s
fmhanced
any Ekely ~fNJrc@
of b i u is reveald On voir dire*
Jtsmdve;\ b e v e r , hm ib &quieti* aspecb, i,
People rareby a& to ~ ~ P 0F.n Q'yfiea a d they surely do not
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thdr
TQ dismiss for cau9f~a jurar wb
a&
E.1
serted his eepatdty fa* a~parafinj u d m n t from prejtrdtces
may be pemeiv& by heone
a d by others
degrading ar insulting We !hmld be reluctant to add this
kind of burdm to the ather burdens d jury mrvice, F~rther- ,
more, the l&eli)r;oo$ that a penan wig1 wluenced by ap~~~~ af prejudice not alwws be as clear 9sin
the example sf the gre~adingparag~aph.judicial intuiltisri~
but when atf a s s e ~ t daapaclty for unbiased ju
ahauld override surpiciuas of bias gllmmf surely
well be infrom judm to judm and h$iduajudpB
earnistent
time.
r f t ~ o t j ~ n almost injoluble
&ffifplties far ssytrm
on fie &allengs
for
ta e&IFimiRate;
in$i~&grls
pr@fudimswould inwith f& j u y factfinding. Thb ie h e r e a $uspi&rm
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of bias is engendered not by Mlme articular feature of the
arot's biogs hy or by some speciic prejudice, but rather
by s set af dlf use attitudes that characterize the juror's outh k on life. An irrdkiduel law in taieranw af ambiguity I'
and high in deference #award autlimity might be: likely to
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It WQ rslid on judgs. to axdudq for c a m all individuals
likely to be incapable af fair judgment and if current paactic&i s a guidehthe error of faikirq ta strike b l e d jators
, watrIcf be mme mmrnan than the e r m ~of striking the unbiased, bar b f h sbuld occur. The h h r ~ B Q &0u1d
P
never
be g~onndsfor appeal since tks sttuck juror would, in
t h ~ o ~'be
y , replaced by OM equelly unbiased. The farmer
e m , b e d ~defined by py&01@cal rather than. legdl1
theoq. muld bc very difficult for s p a a t e courts to ban&a, Hance, trial jud d be Iikel@y'to be en amsidsrsble discretien which, in prectics, wwld
largely
ua
a h . Thus, attempt8 ta elim+aatejuror b i J b an
oxpaadad con= tion of what constitufer g w n d s for Xallim m w t leJ lo o system which was in practice only
dig ily ?re etfeotiva than the cumant one.
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The itvailabiUty of pewclmpt&y challengn minimizes tensfomfrrhereat in out sptem of chaUenges for cause, The
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impartial judgment is suBpect, but not so much so as to require their exclusion as a matter of law. The peremptory
chalbnge has the further virtue of saving face for jurors
who have asserted a doubtful capacity to decide in an unbiased fashion since these assertions are never rejected by
the court in the way that they would be if a challenge for
cause was sustained. Mistakes, no doubt, continue to be
made, but they are the mistakes of the parties who suffer
from them and not the mistakes of the court. Finally, the
availability of peremptory challenges allow the courts to
take what is, psychologically speaking, an unduly restrictive
view of when potential jurors are likely to be impermissibly
biased without endangering the quality of jury justice as
substantially as would be if prejudiced jurors not challengeable for cause could not be removed peremptorily. By
limiting the situations in which challenges for +causemust
be gmnted, appellate courts minimize the chance of
reversible error during the jury selection process.
There is no ideal number of peremptory challenges.
Their availability would vary with incidence of potentially
biasing attitudes in the jury population. Generally speaking,
people's biases are more likely to be activated in criminal
than in civil matters and these biases are more likely to
favor the prosecution than the defense. This justifies the
decision to grant more peremptory challenges in criminal
cases than in civil actions and it would also justify a decision to grant criminal defendants more peremptory
challenges than prosecutors. While the number of available
peremptory challenges may be made to turn on whether an
action is criminal or civil, it is impossible to specify in advance appropriate numbers of peremptory challenges for
different types of civil litigation.
Assuming some number is fixed for civil litigation, flexibility may be achieved by judicial administration of the
challenge for cause or by judicial discretion to increase the
number of peremptory challenges available to one or both
parties. Where an action is likely to evoke popular prejudices, the judge should be more willing to allow
challenges for cause despite disclaimers of bias than when
an action appears less emotionally charged. If popular prejudice is directed largely against one side, that side should
have the easier time in excluding jurors for cause or should
be allowed extra peremptory challenges. If one party is to
be awarded extra peremptory challenges, that party should
bear a substantial burden of showing that prejudicial public
opinion is widespread and deeply held. Whatever the
judge's discretion with respect to challenges, the number of
peremptory challenges should be sufficient to allow for the
judge who is unduly rigid in his attitude toward for-cause
challenges. It should allow room to challenge individuals
whose attitudes suggest bias even though their biographies
or acknowledged prejudices do not, and it should take into
account the fact that individuals often have general biases
regarding the kinds of people and organizations who are
parties to typical civil actions. At the same time, it should
not be so large as to allow an attorney too many opportunities to eliminate those who are likely to be unfavorable
by reason of their abilities to rationally evaluate evidence
rather than because of bias.
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While we cannot specify an appropriate number of
peremptory challenges in civil litigation, we feel strongly
that with twelve member juries three peremptory challenges are likely to be inadequate in many cases. Cutting the number of available challenges to two would be
most unfortunate. Whatever the number allowed, we
believe the parties should have the option of increasing the
.'
number of available peremptories by mutual agreement.
'

